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Abstract
Heisei Life Insurance Crisis was unprecedented phenomenon 
in the history which dramatically changed the life insurance 
industry in Japan. Among the 7 bankrupt insurers, 5 were 
mutual and 2 were stock companies. Now that the oral history 
of the managers’ behavior leading up to the failure is avail-
able, it is worthwhile to revisit the issue of corporate gover-
nance and mutual versus stock ownership in the Japanese life 
insurers. By closely reviewing the situation of the 7 insurers 
as well as one more bankrupt insurer, there will be some lim-
ited conclusions drawn as to the views presented in the exist-
ing theoretical study which generally affirm the existence of 
mutual companies and do not see so much significance in 
making a comparative study between mutual and stock own-
ership.
Keywords: managers’ behavior; oral history; unlisted compa-
nies
Introduction
During the 4 years between April 1997 and March 2001, 
as many as 7 life insurers went bankruptcy in Japan. It 
is unprecedented phenomenon in the history of insur-
ance industries in Japan and it is called the “Heisei (the 
era started since 1989) Life Insurance Crisis.” Out of 7 
insurers, 5 insurers were mutual and 2 insurers were 
stock companies. Hence you cannot assert that mutual 
companies are more vulnerable than stock companies if 
you superficially look at the fact that the stock compa-
nies also failed. Although the majority of the 7 insurers 
were mutual companies, it might not be the case that 
they failed due to mutual ownership. Rather it might be 
a natural consequence of the industry situation where 
mutual ownership has been a prevalent form of life 
insurers for the past 60 years. However, now that there 
has been an interesting study made on the cause of the 
failure of the 7 insurers1), it is worthwhile to revisit the 
issue of corporate governance between mutual and 
stock ownership based on case study of Heisei Life 
Insurance Crisis.
　The following hypotheses are conceivable:
　(1) Because far more number of life insurers were 
mutual companies, it should be significant that two 
stock companies experienced the failure. Thus you can 
draw the conclusion that mutual are not less superior to 
stock companies with regards to corporate governance. 
That is to say, the issue of mutual versus stock owner-
ship is not so important as a matter of fact.
　(2) As far as corporate governance is concerned, 
there is no important difference between mutual and 
stock ownership. This is because there was no effective 
corporate governance even in the stock companies. 
While as a matter of theory, stock company is more 
advantageous than mutual company to get corporate 
governance properly functioned, you cannot tell one 
way or another by studying the cases of the failed insur-
ers where corporate governance has been equally 
intact.
1.  Existing Study
(1)  Empirical study
There has not been ample empirical study on mutual 
versus stock ownership in Japan as compared to the 
US2). This is because the number of life insurers is 
extremely small in Japan and the most of them have 
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been mutual companies for many years. Yanase et al. 
(2008) is one of them where they made comparison 
between mutual versus stock, and “keiretsu” affiliation 
versus non-keiretsu life insurers in Japan and drew the 
conclusion that mutual and keiretsu companies have 
less risk taking attitudes than stock and non-keiretsu 
companies respectively. However the number of stock 
insurers was only 4 out of total 20 and all 4 stock insur-
ers are much smaller than some mutual companies 
until 20023). In connection with this study, Kofuji 
(2010a) proposes another interpretation to the effect 
that it is due to the scale of company rather than com-
pany form and affiliation reasons because mutual and 
keiretsu companies are far larger than stock and non-
keiretsu companies.
(2)  Other study
While empirical study has not been so profound in 
Japan, mutual versus stock ownership has been one of 
the most important issues for the past 40 years due to 
ver y prevalent and unique presence of mutual life 
insurers in Japan. There has been accumulation of 
many research papers, ar ticles and theses. Among 
them there is no strong or one sided view on compara-
tive superiority, ef ficiency and governance between 
mutual and stock form (Sugino 2011)
　Some of them are as follows. 
• While there is some notable tendency that more and 
more life insurance companies in overseas countries 
are demutualized recently, I do not see so much 
significance in demutualization of Japanese compa-
nies (Iguchi 2000: 2). 
• It is not reasonable that you make comparison be-
tween mutual companies and stock companies just 
from viewpoint of efficiency (Chano 2001). 
• It is not very significant to make unilateral com-
parison between them (Okamura 2006: 226). 
• As a result of empirical study in the US, there has 
been no clear conclusion that either is more efficient 
than other (Chano 2001).
• There is no evidence that it is a historical certainty 
that the number of mutual companies will be 
decreased (Tanaka 2002: 38). 
• Whether it is mutual company or stock company is a 
matter of strategic decision making by management 
(Yoneyama 2003).
• It is not always true that trend for demutualization is 
universe. There are many mutual companies in the 
world who are well run, respected by customers and 
competitors alike (Birkmaier and Laster 1999: 34).
• Modern nature of mutual company is to prioritize 
policyholder interest under complete control by 
manager because expense sharing policy and self-
governance by policyholders are no more part of 
mutualism in the present mutual company in Japan. 
Therefore what does really matter is manager’s 
ethics and strong leadership to serve for such pur-
poses (Mizushima 1992: 16–7; Mizushima, 2001: 14).
• Because the interests of manager and policyholder 
do not necessarily coincide, it is up to regulatory 
development whether mutual company will really 
pursue policyholder interest (Hetherington 1969: 
1102–3). In Japan, on the contrary, what actually 
precluded mutual companies from achieving 
policyholder interest in 1980s was government policy 
to protect the industry as a whole (Mizushima, 2001: 
10–3).
• As for corporate governance of mutual company, 
Japan might be ahead than UK in that some mea-
sures are incorporated to make its governance 
system comparable to stock company and that the 
procedures of councils meeting and policyholders 
meeting have been built in the system (Hisamatsu 
2006: 70).
2.  Heisei Life Insurance Crisis
(1)  The magnitude of the crisis
It was called as crisis because the number of 7 was 
large enough as compared to the total number of life 
insurers of 31 and all 7 insurers were middle market 
and long lived companies. As of 1996, the total number 
of life insurers was 31, out of which 20 insurers were 
traditional companies with 16 being mutual and 4 being 
stock form. Hence the life insurance industry in Japan 
was called 20-company system for 50 years after the 
war (See Table 1). The total assets of the 7 insurers 
exceeded 10% of the assets of the entire industry and 
some 7 billion yen was poured from the life insurers 
guarantee fund.
　The crisis has changed the landscape of the life in -
surance industry together with the   reform brought by 
the sweeping revision of the Insurance Business Law 
which was enacted in 1995 and put into force in 1996. In 
1996, immediately before Nissan went bankruptcy, 
there were 20 traditional insurers which were dominant 
in terms of amount of premium, This was the situation 
which had lasted for nearly 50 years after the war 
(World War II). That was the so called “20-Company 
system.” The crisis greatly shook this system. The 
number of traditional insurers reduced significantly and 
instead the number of foreign insurers dramatically 
83Corporate Governance and Mutual versus Stock Ownership
increased. Furthermore as a result of revised Insurance 
Business Law, 11 new life insurers were founded in 
1996. All foreign insurers and newly established insurer 
were stock ownership. Hence the presence of mutual 
company has not been so prevalent as in the past 50 
years. In 1980 the number of mutual insurers was 
reduced from 16 to 6 and percentage of premium was 
reduced from 95% in 1980 to 48% in 2010 (see Tables 2 
and 3). The landscape after the crisis is shown in the 
Tables 4 and 5.
　The numbers in Table 3 were obtained from Seimei-
Hoken Kyokai Hyakunen-Shi (One hundred years histo-
ry of Life Insurance Association) and Nissei-Kisoken 
(NLI Research Institute) REPORT. In 1908, there were 
35 life insurance companies including ones under liqui-
dation process and having stopped business. The num-
bers shown here are the ones of the companies who 
were members of the Life Insurance Companies Associ-
ation which was established in 1908. The three foreign 
companies in 1980 were American Life Insurance Com-
pany, American Family Life Assurance Company of 
Columbus and Seibu Allstate Insurance Company. The 
Table 1. 20-Company System in 1996a)
Company Name Form
Premium Income
(billion yen)
At present/successor
1 Nippon mutual ¥5,893 mutual
2 Dai-ichi mutual ¥3,884 stock (2010)
3 Sumitomo mutual ¥3,428 mutual
4 Meiji mutual ¥2,519 merged (mutual)
5 Asahi mutual ¥1,713 mutual 
6 Mitsui mutual ¥1,586 stock (2004)
7 Yasuda mutual ¥1,501 merged (mutual)
8 Taiyo mutual ¥1,281 stock (2003)
9 Daido mutual ¥1,105 stock (2002)
10 Chiyoda mutual ¥860 AIG
11 Fukoku mutual ¥858 mutual
12 Kyoei stock ¥814 Prudential(US)
13 Nippon Dantai stock ¥670 AXA (2001)
14 Toho mutual ¥598 GE Edison
15 Daihyaku mutual ¥500 Manulife
16 Nissan mutual ¥225 Aoba
17 Tokyo mutual ¥211 Taiyo/Daido
18 Heiwa stock ¥84 Foreign company
19 Yamato mutual ¥56 stock (2002)
20 Taisho stock ¥48 Azami
20 companies total ¥27,834 (95%)
Others: 24 companiesb) ¥1,520 (5%)
Total: 44 companies ¥29,354 
Source: Prepared by the author based on the Seimei-Hoken Tokei Go (Statistics of Life Insurance 
Business in Japan) 1997.
a) This is the year where you can see the industry picture before the crisis and the reform of 
Insurance Business Law started to change it dramatically.
b) Thirteen companies newly entered the market in October, 1996.
84
four traditional stock companies in 1980 were Heiwa, 
Taisho, Nihon-Dantai, Kyoei out of which Heiwa 
merged with foreign company, Taisho and Kyoei went 
bankruptcy. In 2001, Nihon-Dantai merged with AXA 
Group making the number of traditional stock company 
zero. Among 7 traditional stock companies in 2010, 4 
are T & D Financial, Dai-ichi Frontier, Fukoku Shinrai, 
and Medikea which were founded by parent traditional 
companies in recent years. Six category (D) companies 
in 2010 are Sony, Orix, Airio, Life-net, Midori, and Nex-
tia (Nissei-Kisoken REPORT September 2011). Life-net, 
Airio Life and Midori-Life started operations in 2008 
and Nextia Life is a new name of SBI-AXA from 2010. 
Life-net is the company founded independently without 
having any sponsor companies for the first time in 74 
years (Iwase 2009: 18).
(2)  Environmental difficulties
Following the high degree of economic growth in the 
1960s and 1970s, there was a so called “bubble econo-
my” in the late 1980s. As measures to the extremely 
favorable balance of trade and large amount of capital 
inflow to the US due to its high interest rate, there was 
a Plaza accord where the policy to introduce the 
exchange rate in favor of yen was agreed upon among 
the G5 countries. In addition to the shift to strong yen, 
Japan took drastic monetary policy for easing to boost 
domestic economy. This was because there was the 
opinion promulgated that the strong yen would not only 
curtail trade but also dampen the domestic economy. 
Between January 1986 and February 1987, the official 
discount rate was reduced 5 times from 5% to 2.5%. The 
government took the action to increase domestic con-
sumption, investment into public enterprise and to 
expedite construction of houses and urban redevelop-
ment. However, in spite of the strong yen, favorable bal-
ance of trade continued resulting in over easing of 
money. The government enacted the Comprehensive 
Resort Improvement Act in 1987 to encourage invest-
ment which would not cause trade friction. This 
brought about the real estate bubble. The Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) prohibited the real estate loan in 
March 1990. In October 1990, the Nikkei Stock average 
plunged to about ¥20,000 from the peak of ¥38,915 in 
December 1989, which represented the burst of bubble 
economy. Since then, Japan had been in recession with 
Table 2 Dominance by Mutual Companies
Percentage of Mutual Cos. 
by Premium
Number of Mutual Compa-
nies
1980 95% 16
1997 89% 15
2000 85% 11
2010 48%   5
Source: Data of 1997 was obtained from Birkmaier and Laster 
(1999, p. 18) and data of other years from Seimei-Hoken Tokei Go 
for the years.
Table 3. Number of Life Insurance Companies
by Year and Type
 Type
Year
（A）
（B） （C） （D）
Mutual Stock
1908   1 15
1950 16   4
1980 16   4   3
2000 11   1 15 13 3
2010   6   7 18   9 6
Source: See the description in the main text.
Table 4. Proportion of Premium Income
by Company Type (2002)
Table 5. Proportion of Premium Income
by Company Type (2010)
Number
Premium 
（Trillion yen）
Increase 
（%）
Share 
（%）
（A） 11 19.70 △ 7.8 76.2
（B） 18   4.58    29.0 17.7
（C） 10   0.97    38.2   3.8
（D）   2   0.61 △ 5.4   2.4
Total 41 25.86 △ 1.6 100
Source: Nissei-Kisoken REPORT, September 2003.
Number
Premium 
（Trillion yen）
Increase 
（%）
Share 
（%）
（A） 13 19.03      1.1 68.6
（B） 18   6.18 △ 0.4 22.3
（C）   9   1.63 △ 9.3   5.9
（D）   6   0.92   9   3.3
Total 46 27.76      0.3 100
Source: Nissei-Kisoken REPORT, September 2011.
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low stock value and interest rate for 20 years. The low 
interest rate and the depreciation of the stock value 
were two of the most important causes of the failure.
　Along with the economic growth, life insurance in -
dustry also developed to be one of the largest in the 
world. More than 90% of the household contracted life 
insurance although it was the second largest spending 
after house expenses with the average amount of yearly 
premium being ¥450,000 per family (Iwase 2009: 33). It 
was sold well as a security for inadvertent loss of a 
bread earner in the family. Therefore one of the most 
major products was long term life insurance which con-
tributed very much to the rapid growth of life insurance 
in Japan. In 1980s, pursuing and competing with others 
for expansion of the scale, the life insurers changed 
their strategy so as to sell savings type insurance such 
as endowment insurance and endowment insurance 
with term insurance as a policy rider. The savings type 
insurance was very much in line with the Japanese con-
sumer’s taste that would prefer savings type insurance 
to pure term insurance. Those savings type insurance 
was sold with high guaranteed interest rate and high 
dividend. It was because the interest rate was high dur-
ing those years and insurers competed to offer high 
dividend. The gap between the actual interest rate and 
the guaranteed interest rate was the back spread which 
intrigued the life insurers for many years up to the 
present. 
　As of March 2000, the assumed interest rate of top 14 
insurers was 3% to 4% and the actual interest rate was 
2% resulting in the back spread of ¥1.6 trillion (Fukao 
and JCER 2000: 5). In case of large insurers, they had 
mortality rate profit and expense rate profit to make up 
the loss of back spread. However, the majority of medi-
um and small size insurers had no alternative but to 
cover the loss by profit on securities sold. Then, the 
lowering of the stock value had the adverse effects in 
the two fold. One, they could not gain such profit any-
more. Two, their assets deteriorated by the deprecia-
tion of the value. By the way, during the economic 
growth where the stock price hiked in the long run, 
latent profit on securities in balance was the buffer for 
inadvertent loss for all companies not just life insurers. 
　Thus low interest rate and low stock value as a result 
of bursting bubble economy, change of product strategy 
and competition for expansion of assets, high guaran-
teed interest rate and high dividend are all environmen-
tal difficulties to which all life insurers were commonly 
exposed in the crisis.
3.  Company Profile and Cause of Failure
As for Heisei Life Insurance Crisis, there have been 
many books and articles published on its background, 
mechanism, cause, outcome and ramifications etc. 
Some of the representatives are Fukao and JCER (2000, 
2002), Kofuji (1999, 2001, 2003), Takeda (2008) and 
Uemura (1999, 2000, 2008). References were made to 
those books and especially in connection with descrip-
tion of businesses as well as facts and anecdotes sur-
rounding the management of the companies, Uemura 
(2008: 82–194) were relied upon, which is the book 
written based on the oral histor y4) taken from 33 
persons who were actually involved and witnessed the 
crisis leading up to the bankruptcy as insiders of the 
companies.
(1)  Nissan Life Insurance Mutual Company
Nissan was founded as a company belonging to Hitachi 
and Nissan group in 1909 and depended on group busi-
ness until the former 1980s. At Nissan, the proportion 
of group insurance was larger than personal insurance. 
This is rather unique in the industry and, there were 
only 2 such companies. They were Nihon Dantai and 
Tokyo. Some 70% of Nissan’ group insurance was from 
the Hitachi and Nissan group (Uemura 2008: 88). 
Towards 80th anniversary of the company in 1989, they 
decided to aggressively pursue the long time goal to 
develop and expand into personal insurance market. 
Because it was difficult for them to cope up with large 
insurers regarding the business model of using sales 
persons, they chose to form alliance with banks and to 
sell non-installment personal pension insurance with 
high interest rate and high dividend. They devised the 
personal pension insurance whose premium would be 
paid by the loan from banks. The number of banks with 
whom Nissan tied up was over 160 throughout the 
country (Takeda 2008: 8). They were just eager to 
enlarge their business and to lessen their expense loss 
without realizing risk of high interest and high dividend 
and reliance upon the particular product.
　The personal pension insurance with the loaned pre-
mium sold very well and the premium was 235% in 1987 
and 219% in 1988 of the previous years. The assets 
increased from ¥368 billion to ¥1.6 trillion during 1985 
and 1989. Nissan generated the premium of 1.4 trillion 
for the three years from 1987 to 1989, nearly 60% of 
which (¥800 billion) was personal pension insurance. 
Out of which, ¥730 billion was non-installment insur-
ance with assumed interest rate of 5.5% to 6% and term 
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of 20–30 years. The proportion of personal pension to 
the technical provisions was 56% as against the industry 
average of 7% (Uemura 2008: 91–2).
　In order to pay such high interest and dividend, they 
made investment into volatile stock and foreign bond 
and were heavily influenced by change of stock price 
and exchange rate of foreign currency. The investment 
balance of the stock became 300% for 3 years from 
1986. As of 1991, they summed up loss due to devalua-
tion of the stock and recouped the deficit from the tech-
nical provision and capital gain from the real estate. 
While the profit from three sources was ¥30 billion, the 
depreciation loss of the stock was ¥90.3 billion (Uemura 
2008: 94). As a result, the ordinary profit was 1/30 of 
the previous year. From 1993, Nissan could not achieve 
profit of three sources any more owing to back spread 
of interest rate and given the latent loss of assets, they 
were in the condition of deficiency. Besides them, as a 
measure in closing accounts, Nissan came to invest into 
structured bond and derivatives which aggravated their 
performance due to the change of market condition 
(Takeda 2008: 8–9). Thus Nissan was as a matter of fact 
insolvency as early as 1994.
　Mr. Sakamoto was the president from 1987 through 
1994. He was the vice president in 1981 and had taken 
initiative in preparing the middle term management 
plan in 1985. At Nissan, the sales department had pow-
er but Mr. Sakamoto had no experience in sales. Mr. 
Sakamoto together with his 4 or 5 aides had influential 
power. Mr. Sakamoto did not exert any leadership to 
improve the situation (Uemura 2008: 97). He was sim-
ply pleased with the sales promotion by alliance with 
banks. They were not concerned about the risk of inter-
est rate and only interested in movement of stock price. 
The relationship between the financial department and 
the actuarial department was not good. Thus Nissan 
did not have asset-liability management (ALM) (Uemura 
2008: 98). 
　About 60% of the representative meeting was Hitachi 
and Nissan group people and no check and control by 
the meeting (Uemura 2008: 99–100). Eight companies 
from Hitachi and Nissan group had sent the directors 
but they did nothing in the board meeting with the 
exception of Nissan Fire. MOF did notice the problem 
in the early 1990s at the time of audit. However the 
audit then was to review the assets and profit from 
three sources for each year. So it is questionable wheth-
er MOF had sensed any problem in interest risk in con-
nection with the growing technical reserves (Uemura 
2008: 101). Although Nissan was almost insolvent 
around 1994, MOF did not take any decisive action until 
1997. The reason for that was probably because no via-
ble system and plan was prepared yet for rescuing the 
insolvent insurer (Uemura 2008: 101).
(2)  Toho Life Insurance Mutual Company
Toho was founded as the first draft insurance company 
in Japan in 1898 and Mr. Seizo Ota became the presi-
dent in 1909 since then Ota family controlled the 
company. In the late 1980s, Toho headed towards 
enlargement of their business and aggressively sold 
savings type insurance. As a result, the assets have 
grown to be 280% from 1985 to 1989 (Uemura 2008: 
103). In order to pay high yielding interest, Toho has 
come to make investment into high risk structured 
bond. Besides the growth of assets, it was Toho’s aim to 
eliminate expense loss and pay policyholder dividend 
as high as large insurance companies. In 1989, Toho 
achieved the high dividend but would have to suffer 
from heavy burden of high yielding interest rate as well 
as expensive value of stock.
　Mr. Ota who became the president in 1977, was a 
unique person as a manager of insurance company 
(Uemura 2008: 106–8). He was eager to rescue other 
defunct company, making investment into speculative 
stock etc. without paying due diligence and interest to 
the management of the insurance company. He was 
rather insistent upon the personnel matter and fired the 
capable member of the management leaving only yes-
man around him. The aides surrounding Mr. Ota made 
inappropriate and unethical behavior using the compa-
ny assets. Directors were often chosen from the sales 
department and they did not have enough understand-
ing about the company management.
　Toho increased the stock investment during the bub-
ble economy and the depreciation loss of the stock was 
¥162.2 billion being 20% of the total stock value in 1991 
(Uemura 2008: 110). Toho experienced the first loss of 
insurance business in 1993. The latent profit of the 
stock, which was ¥390 billion in 1989, dwindled to ¥16 
billion. MOF audited and pointed out the problems but 
the management did not take proper action. Latent loss 
of the stock was ¥70 billion as of May 1993. Around 
1993, younger group of the management took initiative 
of management reform (Uemura 2008: 112). They 
determined that recovery on their own was not easy 
and probed for alliance strategy. Toho finally reached 
the agreement with GE Capital to the effect that they 
will jointly establish GE Edison Life Insurance so as to 
have the company purchase the sales channel and that 
Toho would manage the maintenance of the past con-
tract only in 1998 (Takeda 2008: 11). While Toho 
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received ¥120 billion as goodwill expenses etc. it was a 
disadvantageous deal for Toho (Uemura 2008: 114). 
　In June 1999, Toho went bankruptcy when Tohmatsu 
requested the disposition of latent loss and bad debt in 
the amount of ¥231.3 billion, which resulted in the defi-
ciency of ¥200 billion (Fukao 2000: 114). Under Mr. 
Ota, there was no internal control and no risk manage-
ment. One of the aides did not produce the breakdown 
of the investment for the meetings of the managing 
directors in the late 1980s and did not provide with the 
actuary department any data for solvency margin in 
1990s (Uemura 2008: 115). A member of the represen-
tative meeting was chosen by the presidents as he liked 
(Uemura 2008: 116). MOF had requested the presi-
dent’s resignation in 1993 and Mr. Ota resigned in 1995.
(3)  Daihyaku Life Insurance Mutual Company
Daihyaku was founded as one of the Kawasaki group 
company in 1914. Their main product was savings type 
insurance from the beginning. Although they tried to 
develop their business into life insurance section for 
long time, the proportion of savings insurance to the 
personal insurance was still very high, that is to say, 
73% in 1980 and 60% in 1985 (Uemura 2008: 121). As a 
result, their profitability was low and Life Insurance 
Association adopted their performance data as bench 
mark to determine the mortality rate, expense loading 
and dividend rate until 1980s (Uemura 2008: 121–2). 
Daihyaku could not overcome the problem of expense 
deficit and insufficient mortality rate profit due to their 
portfolio where the weight of small, savings insurance 
was very high. This is contrasted with Taiyo which had 
similar portfolio and succeeded in improving the per-
formance by drastic reform of sales, product innovation 
and cost cut (Uemura 2008: 123–4).
　The above problem has emerged in 1990s when they 
could not obtain higher investment return. Back spread 
occurred in 1992, interest rate loss could not be made 
up by expense rate profit and mortality rate profit in 
1993. In 1994, Daihyaku experienced ordinary loss for 
the first time. The financial department issued the 
warning, but the management did not have sense of any 
crisis. From 1997, they launched middle term manage-
ment plan and obtained the fund of ¥19 billion from 4 
banks. After the failure of Nissan and Toho etc., cancel-
lation rate increased from 13.3% to 19.1% in 1997 
(Uemura 2008: 126). Daihyaku contracted financial 
reinsurance with RGA and received the commission of 
¥10 billion which was put into the technical reserve. 
Fur thermore, Daihyaku issued the subordinated 
debenture of ¥38 billion to West German Bank , which 
was later found to be improper (Uemura 2008: 126; 
Takeda 2008: 13).
　The proportion of stock to the assets was 23% around 
1990. Daido reduced the weight from 20% to 10% 
between 1992 and 1993. On the contrary, Daihyaku was 
delayed in disposing of stocks partly because Kawasaki 
family did not like to do it and sales department had 
stronger power within the company (Uemura 2008: 
127).
　In 1994, Mr. Shinjiro Kawasaki became the president 
but they determined that they had no alternative but to 
make alliance with other company (Uemura 2008: 128). 
It was their consideration that the only viable way for 
mutual company to obtain fund was the scheme of 
Toho, that is to say, separation of new and old business. 
They decided on a plan similar to Toho that they would 
receive ¥80 billion by selling the products, sales offices 
including sales person to Manulife Financial and that 
they would continue to operate as a maintenance com-
pany of old business only (Takeda 2008: 13). Immedi-
ately after the alliance, there was sudden increase of 
cancellation which was an influence of Toho bankruptcy 
and loss of tens billion yen due to foreign security 
investment. In 1999, Financial Control Agency (FCA) 
requested to review due diligence of assets. In 2000, 
FCA issued Operation Improvement Order in connec-
tion with the above subordinated debenture. The top 
management did not know about this subordinated 
debenture and only Mr. Shinjiro Kawasaki, then direc-
tor of investment, and his subordinate were aware of it 
according to the newspaper (Uemura 2008: 129). After 
this FCA order, cancellation further increased resulting 
in insolvency and FCA ordered stop doing business.
　While Daihyaku did not treat actuary lightly, actuarial 
opinion was not reflected on the management strategy 
(Uemura 2008: 132). There was no communication 
between the financial and actuarial department. In 
1990s, they formed ALM committee but they did not 
understand what to do (Uemura 2008: 133). The repre-
sentative meeting was just ceremony (Uemura 2008: 
133). There was no governance by MOF. There were 
several presidents from other than Kawasaki family, but 
they did not exert strong leadership (Uemura 2008: 
131). The management was always under influence of 
Kawasaki family.
(4)  Taisho Life Insurance Co., Ltd.
Taisho was founded in 1913 and their main products 
were savings type insurance such as endowment insur-
ance by sales persons. As a traditional company, it was 
one of the smallest and the assets at the peak time 
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(1996) was ¥238 billion which was only 0.6% of Nippon 
Life. Although it was small, Taisho was doing business 
steadfastly until when Nissan failed in 1997 resulting in 
increase of cancellation and back spread  deteriorated 
their financial performance.
　In August 1999, FCA audited and found out the 
excess liability of ¥4.3 billion and early warning mea-
sures were taken in February 2000. Taisho made alloca-
tion of ¥4.5 billion new shares to Claremont Capital in 
return for making investment into ¥100 billion into for-
eign security. The president of Claremont was arrested 
for fraud of ¥85 billion in August and Taisho was 
ordered to halt business by FCA.
　The insurance administrator having looked into the 
matter concluded that the reasons for the failure are as 
follows. Taisho sold savings type insurance with higher 
interest rate (average 4.05%) than other companies. 
Under insufficient internal control, amount of bad debt 
significantly increased. Regarding several important 
matters, directors and auditors did not perform their 
duties. As of 1999, the solvency margin dropped to 
67.7% due to back spread and investment loss. The last 
resort for Taisho was to increase capital by issuing new 
shares to third party. However the third party who 
received the new shares was not conventional financial 
institutions but the Claremont Capital Holdings Co. Ltd, 
and its president in person only, which turned out to be 
a problem as stated above.
　In 2001, Yamato Life Insurance Mutual Company and 
Softbank Finance Co. Ltd. jointly founded Azami Life 
Insurance Co. Ltd. The portfolio of Taisho was trans-
ferred to Azami for ¥7 billion in 2001. Azami also 
received the goodwill from Yamato Mutual which 
remained as a maintenance company. In 2002, Azami 
and Yamoto Mutual merged making Yamato Life Insur-
ance Co. Ltd. Yamato Life Insurance Co. Ltd. went 
bankruptcy in 2008. It was because they suf fered 
investment loss on their high risk investment as a 
result of the World Credit Risk. 
 
(5) Chiyoda Life Insurance Mutual Company
Chiyoda was established in 1904 and was the second 
mutual company in Japan. The first president was Mr. 
Ikunoshin Kadono of Keio University. It was ranked No. 
2 in terms of insurance in force in 1924. It sold the first 
group term insurance in 1948 and the first group pen-
sion insurance in 1950, the first group credit life insur-
ance in 1961. They formed “Satsuki” group with 
Chiyoda Fire, Tokai Bank, Chuo Trust Bank, and 
Tomen in 1970. Before the war, Chiyoda was one of the 
“Big 5” companies. 
　However Chiyoda was delayed in shifting their sales 
force from agency (Keio network) in the country to 
sales person in cities and product from endowment 
insurance to endowment insurance with term insurance 
as a policy holder (Uemura 2008: 136). Then the rank-
ing dropped to No. 10 or so. In 1982, Mr. Kanzaki 
became the president and advocated “return to big” as 
a company’s goal. Their emphasis was to sell savings 
type insurance and especially group pension insurance. 
They were historically strong in group insurance. As 
for personal insurance, they sold a lot of non-installment 
endowment insurance and the proportion of non-install-
ment premium was 40% with the industr y average 
being 25% in 1989 (Uemura 2008: 138). They grew to be 
ranked No. 8 and were referred as “Big 8.” 
　The investment department of Chiyoda was well 
known for its very conservative investment policy. In 
the 1980s, however, it became their mission to cooper-
ate to sales department. That is to say, they provided 
loans to corporate client in return for selling insurance. 
As a result of having bought stocks at the request of the 
sales department, the stock balance at the end of 1989 
became 300% of 1986 (Uemura 2008: 136). From the 
end of 1997, the depreciation loss of the stock amount-
ed over ¥100 billion (Uemura 2008: 136).
　In the course of selling a lot of savings type insurance 
with high interest and high dividend in the late 1980s, 
Chiyoda inclined to make high risk investment such as 
loan to real estate companies and non-bank companies, 
stock, specified money in trust etc. some of them are 
Yokoi group (loan balance ¥80 billion), Aichi group (¥80 
billion), Matsumoto Yu Shoji (¥37 billion) etc. which 
loans were executed during 1988 and 1990 (Uemura 
2008: 139). The investment and loan leading up to bad 
debt was done by one of aides of Mr.Kanzaki. He had 
no prior experience of finance but given exclusive pow-
er on financial matters. As of March 1993, bad debt 
amounted to ¥550 billion being 20% of all loans (Uemura 
2008: 136).
　In June 1993, top 8 life insurers made the amount of 
bad debt public for the first time (Uemura 2008: 144). 
The amount of Chiyoda was ¥231.6 billion which was 
extremely large compared to ¥36.7 billion of Sumitomo 
whose investment policy was famous as aggressive. 
The actual amount of debt was some ¥400 billion. In 
1995, equity capital was minus ¥236 billion. In spite of 
the critical situation, the management did not take any 
quick and decisive action. Compared to other failed 
insurers, Chiyoda still generated expense rate profit 
and mortality rate profit and so the total of three sourc-
es of profit was positive. In 1994, thanks to lowering of 
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guaranteed interest rate of group pension insurance 
from 4.5% to 2.5%, the profit of 1996 increased from ¥
22.9 billion to ¥72.4 billion. In mid 1990s, disposition of 
policy stock was discussed because the latent profit of 
the stock amounted over ¥200 billion. However, there 
was a very strong objection from Mr. Kanzaki group 
and the sales department, they could not make any 
decision to sell the stock.
　Chiyoda acquired the fund of ¥50 billion, the subordi-
nated loan of ¥77.5 billion from Tokai Bank etc. and dis-
posed of the bad debt of ¥138.9 billion in the mid 1990s. 
However the cancellation continued to increase and the 
group pension insurance in force decreased from ¥3 
trillion at the peak to ¥1.2 trillion in 1998 (Uemura 2008: 
149). In the later 1999, stock market plunged and Chi-
yoda started to negotiated with the foreign investors in 
vain. Because the banks turned down to cooperate, the 
alliance with the foreign insurers ended unfruitful. In 
October 2000, Chiyoda applied for bankruptcy with the 
Tokyo District Court.
　Actuary group was part of planning department and 
they were not respected within Chiyoda (Uemura 2008: 
152–3). They had no power against the sales depart-
ment. There was no ALM and no governance by MOF 
(Uemura 2008: 153–6).
(6)  Kyoei Life Insurance Co., Ltd.
Kyoei was founded as a reinsurance company in 1935 
by Mr. Saburo Kawai who was a famous actuary having 
once served as chairman of Actuary Association in 
Japan. After the war, it started as a life insurance com-
pany. Kyoei was not a member of any business group 
and did not have any given customer bases. So, it devel-
oped the niche market such as teachers and educational 
institutions and Defense Agency employees.
　Kyoei mainly sold term insurance instead of endow-
ment insurance which was a major product of the 
industry at that time until the late 1980s. Kyoei was the 
first who sold endowment insurance with term insur-
ance as a policy rider in the 1960s and personal pension 
insurance in 1963. As for personal insurance in force, 
Kyoei was 10th in1970s and 8th 1980s. It sold savings 
type insurance through allied group with guaranteed 
interest rate of 3.75%. Kyoei was in the upper group of 
ranking in terms of insurance in force but in the lower 
group with regards to assets. So Kyoei changed the 
strategy so as to sell non-installment endowment insur-
ance with the interest rate of 5.5% in 1987. It was limited 
to the term of 10 years (Uemura 2008: 158–60).
　What made the problem of back spread serious was 
not only that the term of their endowment insurance 
was 10 years but that Kyoei continued to sell the insur-
ance after other insurers halted to do that. After 1991, 
the increase of the assets of the industry was 8.8% in 
1991, 8.9% in 1992, 8.4% in 1993, and that of Kyoei were 
12.3%, 13.9%, 13.0% respectively (Uemura 2008: 161). 
One of the reasons for the delay was that customers 
were employees of the tied up group and another was 
that there was no one who could to that in spite of the 
objections of the sales department. For several years 
before the failure, the situation continued such that 
interest rate loss was ¥100 billion, mortality rate profit 
was ¥65 billion, expense rate profit was ¥20 billion and 
that the deficit was ¥15 billion. In addition to the back 
spread, the loss on securities sold was ¥18.5 billion in 
1996, ¥47.7 billion in 1997, ¥52.3 billion in 1998, and 
¥90.8 billion in 1999 (Uemura 2008: 164). 
　While Kyoei negotiated to enter into a partnership 
with the Prudential, it was not fruitful because the stock 
market did not improve as expected and Kyoei lost ¥30 
billion being the fund provided to Dai-ichi Fire as a 
result of its bankruptcy in March 2000 (Uemura 2008: 
167). Mr. Kawai was the president from 1935 to 1971 
and there were three presidents after him but all of 
them were under the influence of Mr. Kawai who was 
the only dictator until his death of 1998. Mr. Kawai was 
dif ferent than before in 1980s for his age and he 
resigned from the director in 1992. Nevertheless the 
top management totally relied upon Mr. Kawai. So the 
management was done by Mr. Kawai and his two aides 
until the end (Uemura 2008: 168–9). Kyoei was an 
unlisted stock company and the board meeting was 
only the ceremony. There was no governance from 
MOF (Uemura 2008: 172).
(7)  Tokyo Life Insurance Mutual Company
Tokyo was founded in 1895 as a religion group life 
insurer in Kyoto and became a Nomura group company 
in 1934. It restarted as Tokyo Life mutual company in 
1947. Tokyo was one of 4 zaibatsu companies following 
5 big companies before the war. While Tokyo was as 
big as Fukoku and Daido in mid 1960s, it dwindled to 
half of Fukoku and one third of Daido in late 1970s 
(Uemura 2008: 175). Because their dividend was small-
er than large companies, they were losing policyholders 
from the work place market. The sales persons depend-
ed upon family and community ties to sell insurance 
resulting in higher rate of turnover. Compared to the 
size of the company, they paid larger cancellation divi-
dend for which they relied on profit on securities sold. 
Under the circumstances, profit on the expense ratio 
was lower than other insurers.
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　Tokyo set out for an aggressive sale of personal pen-
sion insurance by loaned premium in mid 1980s and it 
doubled the assets from 1987 to 1989. The guaranteed 
interest rate was 5.5% to 6.25%. After 1990 when loan 
interest rate hiked resulting in the reduction of personal 
pension insurance, it began to sell group pension insur-
ance with high interest rate. Group pension insurance 
in force expanded from ¥230 billion in 1989 to ¥500 bil-
lion in 1993, in spite of the fact that they had a problem 
of the back spread in 1992. In late 1980s, it summed up 
profit of ¥20 billion on securities sold to cover high cost 
dividend obligation. However they were cross deal, the 
value of stock balance went up year by year (Uemura 
2008: 176–9).
　The management spent great amount of money to 
build office building and system investment without 
taking into consideration that the assets are really obli-
gation. In 1992, the problem of back spread surfaced 
for the first time but the management did not take any 
decisive measure regarding it passing problem. They 
could not make up the loss due to back spread with 
expense profit and mortality profit anymore and the 
ordinary profit became negative in 1994 (Uemura 2008: 
181). The failure came as if it had been a natural death 
due to no management or inappropriate management 
over the long time. That is to say, the reasons for failure 
are low profit profile, sudden increase of assets and 
inadequate investment into stock, foreign currency 
security and structured security. Furthermore, there 
were misconduct and illegal behavior by top manage-
ment in the early 1990s. After finally having realized the 
serious problem, Tokyo tried to demutualize and form 
alliance with foreign company in vain leading up to the 
failure in March 2001.
　Mr. Shibayama was the president from 1977 to 1986. 
He was the director in 1957 and the representative 
director in 1969. Mr. Shibayama was only enthusiastic 
about sales promotion (Uemura 2008: 187–8). His suc-
cessors were also from the sales department. At Tokyo, 
the sales department had power and the presidents 
who only had the experience of sales did not very well 
understand the figures of the management. The top 
management was not serious enough to improve the 
situation of the crisis. Although they started the ALM 
strategy board so as to introduce Enterprise Risk Man-
agement in 1996, what they actually did was mainly 
the due diligence of the loan and they were not con-
cerned about the market risk and interest rate risk 
(Uemura 2008: 190). Tokyo was very close with the 
Daiwa Bank who tried to support Tokyo but could not 
avoid the failure.
 4.  Implications of Study
(1)  20-Company system
The 20-Company system consists of 16 mutual and 4 
stock companies (See Table 1). Out of 16 mutual com-
panies, 5 mutual companies, and out of 4 stock compa-
nies, 2 stock companies failed. Thus the failure rate is 
5/16 (31%) for mutual and 2/4 (50%) for stock owner-
ship. Thus stock ownership is more vulnerable. This is 
not fair because larger corporations are all mutual com-
panies with all stock companies being small. Then what 
about the ratio if you take into account only the middle 
market mutual companies. The top 7 companies are 
“large” and the middle 10 companies are “middle” with 
the remaining 3 (Heiwa, Yamato, Taisho) being “small.” 
Then as for 13 medium and small companies, the ratio 
is 5/8 (63%) for mutual and 2/5 (60%) for stock compa-
nies. So the failure rate is not much different between 
mutual and stock ownership. However does analysis of 
this type make sense? We need to take a look at 4 stock 
companies.
(2)  4 stock companies
Four stock companies were all unlisted companies. As 
for their size, please see Table 1 and Table 6. None of 
them exists any more. That is to say, no traditional 
insurer of stock ownership has survived to the present. 
Two went bankruptcy. Other two were merged by for-
eign insurers. Nihon Dantai and Heiwa.
　As you will see from the profit in the Table 6, both 
are considered to be rescue type merger. It might be 
said that the two could avoid bankruptcy because they 
were stock companies and therefore merger was easier 
than bankrupt mutual companies. But it is probable 
that the foreign insurers merged with them for the rea-
sons that they had attractive sales channel etc. So, it 
cannot be substantiated that as a stock company, they 
had better corporate governance than other two mutual 
companies.
(3)  5 mutual vs. 2 stock companies
All 7 insurers are medium and small size companies. 
So, the size of company had something to do with the 
failure. Six insurers were very traditional companies 
with the history of 87 to 107 years except that Kyoei 
had the relatively shorter history of 66 years. Other 
than that, 7 insurers are well spread or balanced 
regarding size, lines of business and origin/ownership 
etc. (See Table 7). Besides the mutual v. stock owner-
ship, what was likely to have some relationships with 
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governance structure was the origin/ownership. In this 
connection, 4 insurers belonged to a large business 
group and one was controlled by the family with anoth-
er being dominated by the founder. Even among the 4 
insurers belonging to a group, there were the dictators. 
They were Mr. Sakomoto of Nissan, Mr. Kawasaki of 
Daihyaku, Mr. Kanzaki of Chiyoda, Mr. Shibayama of 
Tokyo, making the significant feature that 6 companies 
had the dictators who served as the president and 
chairman for a long time (See Table 8). While 7 insur-
ers varied in several ways, there was one important fact 
common to most of them. That is to say, they had one 
man who had the power for long time and either that 
man had no ability to manage the company or after that 
man, no successor could properly manage the company. 
There was no evidence that the dif ference between 
mutual versus stock ownership had somehow influ-
enced the failure or outcome of the failure. Mutual ver-
sus  s tock  ownership  was  jus t  one  o f  severa l 
diversifications with the overwhelming fact that there 
was no management in the company. 
(4)  Yamato Life Insurance Co., Ltd.
There was one more insurer which went to bankruptcy 
in 2008. It was Yamato Life Insurance Co. Ltd. Yamato’s 
case is not included in the Heisei Life Insurance Crisis 
because it took place after the crisis was over and under 
the world credit crisis due to Lehman shock. The rea-
son for the failure was their investment inclined to high 
risk securities (Kofuji 2010b). At Yamato, the average 
assumed interest rate was 3.35%. Their investment was 
public and corporate bond (18.1%), stock (14.6%), for-
eign securities (23.9%), loan (9.6%) in 2007, whereas 
they were 37.3%, 7.4%, 12.1%, 20.8% in 2002. This shows 
that the investment shifted from public and corporate 
bond and loan to more risky stock and foreign securi-
ties. The stock and foreign securities increased 
from7.4% to14.6% and from 12.1% to 23.9% respectively. 
On the contrary, the public and corporate bond and 
loan reduced from 37.3% to 18.1% and from 20.8% to 
9.6% respectively.
　Yamato was a company with a rather strange history. 
Yamato was one of 20 traditional insurers. It was a 
Table 6. Profile of 4 Traditional Insurers of Stock Ownership under 20-Company System
Assets Profit Employees Shareholders
Kyoei ¥5436 B ¥200 M 3037 （+16597） not available
Nihon Dantai ¥385 B ¥2 M 2807　（+6480） 322
Heiwa ¥587 B ¥133 M 817　（+2344） 283
Taisho ¥225 B ¥37 M 393（+10919） not available
Source: Prepared by the author based on NIKKEI; Annual Corporation Reports (UNLISTED) 1996. 
B, billion; M, million. Employees & Shareholders are number of persons or entities, numbers of employees within the 
parenthesis are sales persons, data as of 1996.
Table 7. Demography of 7 Insurers
Company History Form  Size Lines Group
Nissan（16） 1909–1997（89） mutual M C G （Hitachi-Nissan）
Toho（14） 1898–1999（102） mutual M P F（Ota family）
Daihyaku（15） 1914–2000（87） mutual M P G（Kawasaki）
Taisho（20） 1913–2000（88） stock S P Independent
Chiyoda（10） 1904–2000（97） mutual L C G（Satsuki）
Kyoei（12） 1935–2000（66） stock L C I（Founder）
Tokyo（17） 1895–2001（107） mutual M P G（Nomura）
Source: Prepared by the author based on Uemura (2008) etc. The parenthesis after company name is ranking by 
income in 1996 (see Table 1).
L, large; M, medium; S, small. The size is the comparison within 7 insurers. C, commercial line; P, personal line; G, 
group company; F, family company.
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mutual company as small as Taisho, although Taisho 
was a stock company (See Table 1). The predecessor 
company of Yamato was founded as a draft insurance 
company in 1911. It converted to Yamato Life Insurance 
Co. Ltd in 1945 and restarted as Yamato Life Mutual 
Company in 1947. Yamato was restructured into two 
companies with one being Yamato (old) which only 
dealt with old businesses and another being Azami 
which was founded jointly with Softbank Finance to 
succeed Yamato’s new businesses in 2001. Taisho’s 
portfolio was transferred to this Azami. Then Azami 
and Yamato (old) merged giving birth Yamato (new) in 
2001. Yamato was also an unlisted stock company.
　Kofuji (2010b) proposed the observation that this 
was one example of a stock company having more risk 
taking tendency than mutual company. At the same 
time, Kofuji (2010b) pointed out that the president of 
Yamato (new) did not have insurance but securities 
business background. As the preceding 7 insurers, the 
failure of Yamato (new) was ultimately attributable to 
poor management by the president. Because Yamato 
(new) was unlisted company too, there appeared to 
have been no proper governance by shareholders. 
Therefore you cannot assert that the company was 
more risk taking thanks to stronger corporate gover-
nance, which was the finding by Keizai Zaisei Hakusho 
(Economics Finance Whitepaper by Japanese Govern-
ment) of 2008. In case of Yamato (new), the president 
was almighty and not so capable as to avoid bankruptcy. 
If that is the case, the corporate form whether it is 
mutual or stock ownership should not be relevant to its 
corporate governance and solvency.
5.  Conclusion
There was assumption, at least theoretically, that mutu-
al ownership was inferior to stock ownership in terms 
of corporate governance. Although there was not much 
empirical study in Japan on the issue, majority of the 
past study was generally affirmative on the predomi-
Table 8. Managers’ Behavior and Corporate Governance.
Company Managers’ behavior and corporate governance
Nissan
 (mutual)
Mr. Sakamoto 1987–1994, 8 years (vice president from 1981)
No care about interest risk and no leadership
4 or 5 aides given too much power
Representative meeting consisted of affiliated group’s employees
MOF possibly aware of insolvency situation around 1994 and no action
Toho 
 (mutual)
Mr. Ota 1977–1995, 19 years, no interest in managing insurance company, occupied by strange idea other than 
insurance
Too much power given to aides, confidentiality system
Daihyaku
 (mutual)
Mr. Daijiro Kawasaki 1965–1973 (1987), 23 years,
Mr. Mr. Fukuchi 1987– 1996, Mr. Komori 1996–1998, no leadership
Mr. Shinjiro Kawasaki 1998– (son of Daijiro)
Representative meeting was just ceremony
Taisho
 (stock)
Directors and auditors did not perform their duties on several important matters.
Chiyoda
 (mutual)
Mr. Kanzaki president/chairman 1982–1999, 18 years, no experience other than sales, did not do anything by him-
self
3 aides were given too much power
One aide in charge of finance was wrong selection, he did not have any experience of finance
Kyoei
 (stock)
Founded by Mr. Kawai (actuary)
Mr. Kawai was dictator from 1935 through 1998 until his death
Mr. Tayama (1986–1994), Mr. Otsuka (1994–2000) totally depended on Mr. Kawai who did not have energy and 
capability he had before in 1980s, that is to say, no management after Mr. Kawai in 1980s
Tokyo
 (mutual)
Mr. Shibayama 1977–1986 (1957 director and 1969 managing director), and his successors were from sales only 
background, did not well understand management
Inappropriate behavior by Mr. Shibayama and another director
No management
Source: Prepared by the author based on Uemura (2008) etc.
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nant existence of mutual companies. Under the circum-
stances, it was the author’s expectation that a case 
study of the Heisei Life Insurance Crisis might give us 
some insight on the issue of corporate governance and 
mutual v. stock ownership, because both mutual and 
stock companies went bankruptcy. As a result of the 
study, the followings are the conclusions:
(1)  Comparison on mutual versus stock ownership
The presence of stock companies under the 20-compa-
ny system is very small and mutual and stock compa-
nies are far beyond balancing in any way. Therefore it is 
not very effective to make any comparison using the 
data or the cases of insurers under the 20-company sys-
tem. The number of stock companies is only 4 out of 20. 
Likewise the proportion of total amount of assets is 5.8% 
for stock companies and 94.2% for mutual companies 
respectively5). Besides that, if we are to do a compara-
tive study on corporate governance, it is even more 
important that all stock insurers are unlisted compa-
nies. Because they are unlisted companies, you cannot 
expect that they have such ordinary governance as any 
normal listed companies would have had. This is espe-
cially true for 2 bankrupt companies. Taisho was the 
smallest in 20 companies. While Kyoei was large 
enough, they were not only unlisted but rather excep-
tional in that they were dominated and under the influ-
ence by the founder for nearly 60 years. That is to say, 
the two stock companies are no different than mutual 
companies in that there was no governance by the 
shareholders. So, you cannot rebut the assertion that 
mutual companies or 5 bankrupt mutual companies and 
stock companies or 2 bankrupt stock companies are not 
necessarily good examples to make any comparison 
between mutual versus stock ownership.
 
(2)  “There are mysterious victory and no mysterious 
loss”
Other than the above (1), 7 insurers are fairly spread 
and balanced. There were 2 large, 4 medium, and 1 
small company, 3 commercial lines and 4 personal lines 
companies, 4 group af filiated companies, 2 family/ 
founder companies, and 1 independent company (See 
Table 7). In spite of such diversification, it is rather 
astonishing to find that most of them have one feature 
in common. That is the fact there were one dictator in 
the companies. Those dictators served as the presi-
dent/chairman or ex-chairman for extraordinarily long 
time, causing the ultimate reasons for the failure. 
Nobody could check or control their behavior or they 
did not have the system to change the dictator or to 
have capable successor to take over his position. This is 
the lack of corporate governance. If you have such fun-
damental and vital shortcomings, it does not matter 
whether it is mutual or stock ownership. This is analogy 
of the old war time proverb saying “mysterious victory, 
no mysterious loss.” This means it is easy to find why 
we lost although it is not so easy to find why we won. In 
connection with this study, it is easy to identify why 
they failed and the reason was identical for all the 7 
insurers. Therefore, as a case study to make compari-
son between mutual versus stock ownership, it is more 
appropriate to take up success cases than failure cases. 
(3)  The views presented in the existing study
The findings as stated above are generally compatible 
with the views presented in the existing study (1-(2)). 
The views which seem to be generally consistent with 
the findings are as follows:
• While there is some notable tendency that more and 
more life insurance companies in overseas countries 
are demutualized recently, I do not see so much 
significance in demutualization of Japanese co m-
panies (Iguchi 2000: 2). 
• It is not reasonable that you make comparison be-
tween mutual companies and stock companies just 
from viewpoint of efficiency (Chano 2001). 
• It is not very significant to make unilateral co m-
parison between them (Okamura 2006: 226). 
• As a result of empirical study in the US, there has 
been no clear conclusion that either is more efficient 
than other (Chano 2001). 
• There is no evidence that it is a historical certainty 
th at the number of mutual companies will be 
decreased (Tanaka 2002: 38). 
• Whether it is mutual company or stock company is a 
matter of strategic decision making by management 
(Yoneyama 2003).
(4)  Corporate governance in Japan
There was the hypothesis that as a matter of fact the 
dif ference between mutual versus stock ownership 
does not matter with regards to corporate governance 
in Japan. That was true after having reviewed the cases 
of 7 bankrupt insurers. While all 4 stock companies 
including 2 failed companies were unlisted companies, 
it must not have made any difference if they were listed 
companies. In 1990’s it emerged as one of the most seri-
ous problems that there was no corporate governance 
in Japan. That was considered to be due to the so called 
“Japanese style management” where shareholders 
interest was not so much respected from the viewpoint 
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of company managers and directors did not do their job 
of monitoring and checking the execution by managers. 
As a result, several important revisions were made to 
the Corporate Law so as to improve corporate gover-
nance in 2000s. Therefore it is no wonder that stock 
insurers were no different than mutual insurers as to 
the fact that there was almost no governance by the 
shareholders. As for the insurers who survived the cri-
sis, there is some possibility that there might have been 
some governance by others than the shareholders and 
directors or that they happened to have capable manag-
ers. There is some evidence that the middle manage-
ment had such function as corporate governance in 
large Japanese corporation (Kagono et al. 2010: 257−8). 
If that was the case with Japanese mutual companies is 
the subject yet to be substantiated. 
　This is the paper presented at the 16th Asia-Pacific 
Risk and Insurance Association annual conference held 
in Seoul during July 22 through 25, 2012.
Notes
1) Uemura (2008) put together the reports based on the 
interviews with 33 people who were involved in the crisis 
or witnessed as insiders what was going on in those com-
panies before and during the crisis.
2) The issues of mutual versus stock insurers have been 
extensively studied in the US and there is a large body of 
literature concerning conflict of interest, expropriation of 
interest, adverse selection and efficiency issues etc. rang-
ing from Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen 
(1983) to He and Sommer (2010) etc. Some of the empiri-
cal studies are Boose (1990), Cummins and Zi (1998), 
Jeng and Lai (2005) etc. comparing efficiency between 
both organizational forms and Mayers and Smith (1986), 
McNamara and Rhee (1992), Jeng et al. (2007), Erhem-
jamts and Leverty (2010) etc. examining effects of mutual-
ization and demutualization respectively.
3) The data Yanase et al. (2008) used is the ROA of the 20 
life-insurers between1976 and 1995.
4) Oral history means the collection and preservation of any 
historical information regarding experience by individuals 
and organizations. It is usually done by interviewing peo-
ple who participated or witnessed the experience. Oral 
history strives to gather information from different per-
spectives and any type of information which cannot be 
found in written documents. It will serve for many purpos-
es including preservation of history for future generations 
and is well established and respected discipline in social 
science. See Mikuriya (2002).
5) The amount of total assets of 4 stock companies was 
¥10,575,519 million whereas the amount of total assets of 
20 companies was ¥183,585,319 million in 1996.
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